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The Industrial Revolution as the Escape from the Malthusian Trap 
John Komlos, University of Munich 
 Need one state the obvious, that the Industrial Revolution has surely fascinated as 
many historians as any other topic in the history of civilization? It was undoubtedly one 
of the most momentous development, one which continues to have a major impact on 
virtually all aspects of human experience. It changed the very basis of our existence: not 
only in the way we produce and consume, but outside of this realm as well, from our 
social interactions, to our political system. In short, the processes unleashed by the 
Industrial Revolution are crucial to understanding the primary forces that shaped the 
modern world.1 Yet, in spite of the immense outpouring of literature on the topic, there 
is much confusion regarding appropriate conceptualizations. I review some of the salient 
conflicting viewpoints, and outline the complexities of change without claiming to do 
justice to a literature whose enormity prohibits precision within the modest confines of 
an essay.2 I conclude by arguing that it is useful to think of the Industrial Revolution as a 
multidimensional pan-European process with deep roots in the past, intricately 
intertwined with demographic developments. 
Paradigms and Controversies 
 There are a multitude of reasons why the debate over the Industrial Revolution is 
far from moving toward closure. One of these is that scholars have tended to focus 
excessively on the British experience to the disadvantage of continental developments, 
and on a few branches of industry, instead of either the industrial sector, or the economy 
as a whole.3 Such an approach is bound to distort, inasmuch as it is concerned with 
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selected aspects of a larger process.4 It belittles parallel developments across the 
channel, as well as the simultaneous expansion of economic activity in a large number of 
regions, such as, Alsace, Bohemia, Flanders, Hamburg, Lombardy, the North of France, 
Saxony, Silesia, and the Zurich highlands, to name just a few.5 Yet, these achievements 
were in some ways quite substantial: for example, the industrial labor force of Bohemia 
and Moravia, for instance, expanded at a rate of four percent per annum between 1760 
and 1800, well above British growth rates.6 On a per capita basis, the French economy 
grew as impressively in the eighteenth century as did the British. Perhaps it was not 
accidental that contemporaries noted in 1799 that the Industrial Revolution had begun in 
France.7 
 The narrow concentration on Britain fails also to appreciate alternative 
developmental processes, e.g., that the economic expansion was accompanied 
everywhere by an acceleration in population growth, as during the cyclical upswings of 
the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Focusing on England emphasizes excessively those 
segments of the economy in which the island kingdom was, indeed, an unquestionable 
leader: cotton textiles, steel, and steam engine production, to the detriment of numerous 
industries (silks, linens, needles, cutlery, glass, woolens and porcelain production), in 
which profits were to be had, but in which Britain was not setting the pace. The 
conventional wisdom also overlooks that "London paper makers strove eagerly to learn 
the secrets of French, Dutch, and Italian superiority; London calico printers imitated the 
methods practiced in Hamburg, while tin-plate makers set up rolling mills of Swedish 
design.8 In short, England's manufacturing technology was by no means the best in the 
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world in every respect. That paradigm also minimizes the contribution of other sectors 
(i.e., finance in Amsterdam) to economic growth, including the concurrent expansion in 
agricultural exports from Eastern Europe and North America that propagated growth 
impulses throughout their economies.9 Hence, we should be more open to appreciating 
the uniform patterns in development, and not magnify out of proportion the differences 
in outcomes.10 In many respects, the countries on the continent were by no means merely 
following in Britain's footsteps.11 
We should also leave room in our theories for the fact that ex ante expected 
profits in various endeavors could vary legitimately, due to asymmetric information, 
industry specific skills, resource endowments, or location externalities. In Britain, the 
accumulated knowledge of the cotton textile trade with India, and the experience gained 
in being an entrepot for raw cotton, could have sufficed to lead British entrepreneurs in 
one direction and their continental counterparts, who lacked such information, in 
another.12 The British investment in cotton technology paid off well during the first 
phase of the Industrial Revolution, but that was by no means apparent ex ante.13 An 
important point frequently disregarded is that a spatially widespread outburst of creative 
energy occurred simultaneously. 
 Moreover, Britain's leadership, even in the narrow sense, was quite short lived.14 
Not only was the standard of living in North America higher in some ways,15 but by the 
early nineteenth century US industrial efficiency reached that of England.16 Even in 
cotton spinning technology, firms on the Continent did not remain far behind for long. 
By the 1830s Alsatian and Swiss producers were almost on par with Lancashire, and 
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machines built by Escher Wyss of Switzerland were found to be superior in many ways 
to English ones.17 If the Continent's development had been substantially below that of 
England in 1760, it would not have been able to ameliorate its backwardness so quickly. 
These counterexamples indicate that to gain a balanced perspective on the Industrial 
Revolution we need to shift our focus from Britain to the world economy in which it was 
embedded.18 
 A related issue is that the appropriate geographic unit of analysis has remained 
ambiguous. Is Lancashire, England, Great Britain, or the United Kingdom to be used for 
comparative purposes, and what are their appropriate counterparts? Ought one compare 
a small country, such as England, to a large one, such as France with a population four 
times as large?19 Inasmuch as the Industrial Revolution was essentially a regional 
phenomenon, the state is not necessarily the proper spatial unit of analysis.20 According 
to Francois Crouzet, the "industrial revolution was not made in England but in a few 
small districts of England - south Lancashire, some sectors of the East Midlands and 
Yorkshire, Birmingham, and the Black Country."21 East Anglia, Westmoreland, and 
Cornwall did not industrialize. Moreover, Herbert Kisch's regional studies of 
industrialization showed how far advanced German industry was in the eighteenth 
century, and demonstrated the conceptual weakness of equating the Industrial 
Revolution with a few innovations in the textile sector.22 He concluded, that historians 
"failed to appreciate the achievements" of the industrial enclaves in Krefeld, the 
Rhineland, Saxony, and Silesia.23 Crouzet argued similarly that French economic 
development commanded more respect than it is usually accorded.24 
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 Yet another source of contention has been, that a consensus on a definition of the 
Industrial Revolution has been elusive. In many minds the Industrial Revolution is 
practically synonymous with technological change: "the technological changes that we 
denote as the 'Industrial Revolution' implied a far more drastic break with the past than 
anything since the invention of the wheel."25 In this view, the design of the rotary steam 
engine, the discovery of iron puddling, and, above all, the mechanization of cotton 
spinning, all British achievements, signaled the beginning of the Revolution. However, 
this position does not appreciate sufficiently the precursors of these inventions.26 After 
all, examples of technological creativity abound: thousands of water-driven machines 
had provided inanimate source of power in fulling mills, in mines, and in iron works 
since the Middle Ages.27 Already in 1066, there were 6,000 water mills in operation in 
Britain.28 These developments even led some to argue that there was an "industrial 
revolution of the thirteenth century.”29 An example of a subsequent invention is the 
spinning wheel, which increased labor productivity manifold after 1530. Mines in the 
early seventeenth century used wooden railways, suction pumps, and water-driven 
bellows; forge hammers and stamp-mills were some of the sophisticated mechanized 
technologies in use. The increase in coal production in England from 0.2 to 3 million 
tons per annum between the 1550s and 1680 led Nef to write of "an early industrial 
revolution" of the sixteenth century.30 Technological progress was clearly visible: by the 
first days of the eighteenth century, copper, tin, and lead were smelted in reverbatory 
furnaces using coke as fuel, preparing the way for their adoption in the iron industry.31 
 Darby's application of this technique to iron smelting in 1709 paved the way to 
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the adoption of this technology later in the century. Steam engines were operating in 
mines beginning with 1712. The lint-mills in Scotland after 1729 "were equipped with 
machines for breaking and scutching flax."32 In sum, machines were in widespread use 
well before the Industrial Revolution: the inventions of the eighteenth century took place 
in a civilization that was technologically and scientifically well advanced, and that 
sophistication was by no means confined to the British Isles.33 Hence, it is crucial to 
recognize that the Industrial Revolution grew out of, and continued a tradition to 
improve the material condition with the use of productivity-enhancing devices, even if 
the rate of technical progress after 1760 was, to be sure, unprecedented.34 
 Therefore, the "leading sector" model of the Industrial Revolution, according to 
which growth first accelerated in cotton textile production, and then spread to other 
sectors of the economy, provides a distorted view of the nature of industrial progress. 
Once one questions the common wisdom that the cotton textile sector was - by itself - 
the harbinger of modernization, then prior and contemporaneous achievements in other 
branches and other processes, important in their own right, become discernable. The 
economic expansion was evident practically everywhere: from the outset the Industrial 
Revolution was regionally widespread, encompassed a large array of technologies and 
branches of industry.35 
 Arguably, technological inventiveness might have been the single most 
impressive aspect of eighteenth-century achievements, yet the ubiquitous and incessant 
efforts to improve the human condition is just as awe inspiring. From agriculture to 
government, and to infrastructure, the emphasis was on organizing and producing more 
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rationally, and hence more efficiently. The significance of the increased use of paper 
money, for example, can be easily overlooked. In a similar vain, improvements in public 
sanitation were important in guarding against recurring epidemics. There were also 
advances in definition of property rights, such as the development of patent laws.36 In 
other words, practically all aspects of the society and economy were improving and 
helping to shift the production function outward, and not only in England. To accentuate 
technological change without proper emphasis on improvements in other spheres, 
including a credible political system, is misleading.37 
 Furthermore, the technological "marvels" of the eighteenth century initially found 
limited application, even within England. Economic growth had become a permanent 
feature of the European economies even before these technologies contributed 
significantly to aggregate labor productivity. Productivity was increased through other 
means, not only through the introduction of new techniques. Smith's example of the 
gains in efficiency brought about by the division of labor in a pin factory is part of the 
folklore of economics. Less well known, however, is that at the same time such gains 
were also captured in a number of other branches. 
 The endogenous nature of technological change has also been underestimated. Its 
acceleration in the eighteenth century was fostered by urbanization, which facilitated a 
creative response to the challenges of an increasing population pressure faced after 
1750.38 The unprecedentedly large urban sector was important, because "technological 
innovation proves to have been of distinctly urban origin."39 Thus, it was beneficial in 
this respect that already 25 percent of the English population was urban. Furthermore, in 
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the wake of the Scientific Revolution, ordinary people assimilated a world-view that was 
becoming more rational and secular.40 With the role of magic receding, attitudes were 
more materialistic and calculating. People could reason logically in conducting 
experiments with industrial technology, thereby amassing practical experience, 
know-how, and benefiting from productivity advances induced by learning-by-doing. 
 Innovations in industrial organization enabled entrepreneurs to utilize larger 
machines, to benefit from the division of labor, and the resultant scale economies of 
mass production methods lowered average costs. Nonetheless, one should not go as far 
as to conceive of the Industrial Revolution as the transition to factory production, as, for 
instance, in Mendel's model of proto-industrialization.41 After all, "factories," i.e., large 
scale firms, partly mechanized and with considerable fixed capital investments predate 
the Industrial Revolution: medieval silk filiatures, for instance, bore similarities to their 
eighteenth-century counterparts producing cotton yarn. The "first modern British textile 
factory" was a large water-powered silk throwing mill put into operation in Derby in 
1721, i.e., before the Industrial Revolution. In addition, "it is unreasonable to exclude 
from the factory sector ironworks, copper-smelters, chemical works, engineering shops," 
inasmuch as these were often large establishments even before the classical factory 
age."42 Huge iron combines (multiplant firms) came into operation already in the early 
seventeenth century, and many pre-industrial enterprises, such as bleacheries, dye works, 
glass works, blast furnaces, paper works, and textile printing firms employed hundreds, 
often thousands, of workers, and used some machines in the process of production. In 
short, mechanized large-scale production was not an invention of the Industrial 
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Revolution, and ought not be equated with it. In any event, the proto-industrial sector 
coexisted with factories in a symbiotic relationship for an extended period, even well 
after the Revolution. In other words, the Industrial Revolution did not create modern 
industry; it did not bring about industrialization; rather, it was a continuation of an 
evolutionary developmental process, and built upon the staggering achievements of 
earlier centuries.  
 The discontinuous nature of the Industrial Revolution has also been 
controversial.43 If mechanization, and changes in industrial organization were unique 
developments, and if technological change proceeded abruptly during the second half of 
the eighteenth century, then the processes of growth represented a distinct break with the 
past. In the 1950s such metaphors as "take off" and "great spurt" were used to describe 
the beginning of this process.44 One of the weaknesses of this point of view is that it 
compares the rate of change during the Industrial Revolution with that of the century just 
preceding it, and those were years of relative stagnation. Thus, the growth after 1760 
does appear discontinuous. However, the upswing phase of a business cycle is always 
impressive compared to the preceding trough. In order to make a balanced judgement, 
one needs to evaluate the Industrial Revolution in the perspective of the previous 
long-run development. It then becomes apparent that continuities were superimposed on 
discontinuities, and that the Industrial Revolution can be thought of as possessing 
several discontinuous aspects considered from the perspective of the eighteenth century, 
yet simultaneously be a continuation of previous economic upswings. For this reason, it 
is important to compare the expansion of the late eighteenth century to the boom phases 
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of the late sixteenth century, the previous time during which the European economies 
experienced rapid economic growth. 
 A series of iconoclastic essays in the late 1970s and early 1980s by Nick Crafts 
and Knick Harley prepared the way for a paradigm switch on the conceptualization of 
the Industrial Revolution.45 They demonstrated convincingly that the growth rate of 
British industry was overestimated by the previous generation of quantifiers.46 Instead of 
growing at a rate well in excess of three percent per annum during the closing decades of 
the century, the new estimates put the growth of industrial product closer to two percent 
per annum.47 On a per capita basis the revised estimates of GNP growth are even more 
striking: in the range of 0.5-1.0 percent per annum, practically halving the previously 
obtained results.48 
 However, the conclusion drawn from this finding, that the Industrial Revolution 
is essentially a "misnomer", is hardly warranted.49 Because the pace of transformation 
in the aggregate required longer than the use of the political concept "revolution" 
normally connotes, one does not have to discard the concept entirely. If one takes a 
longer view of the processes of change, say, measured on a scale calibrated in 
centuries, then the metaphor surely does retain its validity. After all, in spite of slower 
economic growth, there is agreement that productivity increased sufficiently rapidly 
not only to outpace population growth, but to overcome diminishing returns to labor as 
well.50 In a historical context, the fact that real wages did not decline by even more, 
was itself a major achievement! Moreover, the structural shift from agriculture to 
industry and services was also unprecedented in both its pace and intensity. Provided 
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one emphasizes the importance of the antecedents of the upswing, as well as the 
coexistence well into the next century of traditional modes of production alongside a 
"germinal" modern sector, one can obtain a more balanced view of the processes of 
change. 
 It is crucial to the understanding of the Industrial Revolution that 
"mechanization in early nineteenth-century Britain was a complex and uneven process; 
large parts of the country and many sectors of the economy were changing slowly, and 
even in the most rapidly transforming areas there were many surviving legacies. The 
amount of craft and small-scale industry was high and still expanding."51 Old 
technologies and traditional modes of organization persisted, and the production of a 
large number of products was not mechanized even by the 1830s, the end of the 
classical phase of the Revolution.52 Hosiery production, clothing, leather trades, coach 
making, building industry, food stuffs, and scores of others were produced using 
traditional methods well into the century. Moreover, there is no warrant, theoretical or 
empirical, for believing that English spinning and weaving inventions were 
indispensable to the success of an Industrial Revolution. Thus, the focus on the 
developments in the cotton textile sector is misleading. 
 Furthermore, the other major breakthrough of the time, - Watt's steam engine - 
spread slowly, and its application remained limited to the cotton textile sector. Even 
half a century after the beginning of the upswing, British industry was still primarily 
powered the same way it had been for hundreds of years, i.e., by exploiting the 
potential energy of falling water.53 The "modern sector employed fewer than 20 
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percent of all workers as late as 1841."54 Among the four largest employers in 
mid-nineteenth century England, a century after the beginning of the Industrial 
Revolution, three were not the ones we usually associate with it: agriculture, domestic 
service, and construction. In fact. Jones concludes that "few aspects of economic life 
were thoroughly altered by 1850." 
 Europe was much more advanced, more industrialized and more urbanized by 
1750 than at any time before.55 Even during the course of the crisis-torn seventeenth 
century, urban population increased by some 25 percent. On the eve of the Industrial 
Revolution, Western Europe was capable of sustaining an urban population of nine 
millions, ten percent of the total.56 The urban share of the population had roughly 
doubled since the beginning of the previous upswing of the 1500s. Inasmuch as towns 
incorporated more social overhead capital than did villages, this fact is also indicative 
of the broad level of wealth accumulated by 1750. Transportation facilities were much 
improved over the centuries, bringing down the cost of moving people as well as 
goods across long distances.57 
 Improvements in river navigation in England by private companies during the 
century prior to 1750 doubled the navigable waterways. The decline in transport costs 
was an inducement to trade, to spatial mobility of factors of production, to shifts out of 
the primary sector, and to specialization within the industrial sector.58 The division of 
labor in the production of such varied products as pins, toys, and pottery "had reached 
such complexity... as to permit reductions in cost of staggering proportions."59 In 
short, by the dawn of the century that was to witness the beginning of the most 
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powerful and most enduring expansion in economic activity in recorded history, only 
40 percent of England's national product originated in the agricultural sector, a share 
that such underdeveloped countries as Hungary did not  reach until the twentieth 
century.60 
 Much of the institutional and incentive structures of a market economy were in 
place well before the eighteenth century.61 Capitalism was not an offspring of the 
Industrial Revolution: "What is called capitalism had long existed in Western Europe. 
In one or another of its forms, it is as old as civilization...."62 Throughout most of the 
continent firms could be organized without overbearing government interference, even 
though guild restrictions, for instance, meant that there were barriers to entry into 
many occupations. However, property rights tended to be secure, and capital markets 
were highly integrated.63 Insurance, paper money, financial know-how, enforcement 
mechanisms for contracts, commercial law, accounting techniques had been 
developed, experimented with, and improved.64 In brief, most, if not all of the basic 
attributes we associate with the modern economy was already an integral part of the 
European business world by 1760. An economic system had evolved, it should be 
stressed, that was sufficiently efficient to overcome further hindrances to permanent 
growth.65 
 We now know that capital formation did not play as important a role during the 
early phase of the Industrial Revolution as the economic historians of the 1950s 
thought.66 The rate of saving did not need to increase so dramatically for the Industrial 
Revolution to become reality:67 in England it increased from 5.7 percent of national 
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income in 1760 to 7.9 percent in 1801, but more as a consequence, than a  cause, of 
the increased rate of output growth.68 One reason for this is that foreign capital was 
also available to the British economy, so that not all investments had to be financed 
from domestic saving, and another was that the productivity of new capital was greater 
than that of the old.69 In addition, fixed capital formation was not only financed from 
new savings, but also from existing circulating capital that was freed up through 
improvements in transportation and communication. 
 Until recently historians did not fully acknowledge that productivity can 
increase not only through the accumulation of physical capital, or technological 
progress, but through a number of other means. Institutional change, 
learning-by-doing, accumulation of human capital, decreasing mortality rates, 
increased financial sophistication, and positive externalities generated by increasing 
population densities can all contribute to increasing productivity. Moreover, the new 
methods of production increased the speed of throughput, thereby saving capital 
invested in inventories. Thus, during the classical phase of the Industrial Revolution 
(1760-1830), the stock of reproducible fixed capital per capita increased by only 0.2 
percent per annum.70 The cost of installing the new machinery, moreover, was 
insignificant relative both to the cost of structures, a fair proportion of which was 
already in place, and, to inventories, which had been required earlier as well. Thus, the 
new requirements of fixed capital did not put an unusual strain on savings, at least 
until the investment in railroads required bulky capital expenditures. The early 
machines were, as a rule, not very expensive. Many of the early designs could be 
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constructed by skilled carpenters.71 Hence, machines composed a small percentage of 
the capital stock: in England merely 2.5 percent in 1800, and 4 percent in 1832.72 
Hence, regardless of which aspect of the process one considers, capital 
formation, industrial organization, or mechanization, one finds that there was "gradual 
metamorphosis and considerable elements of continuity with the past.73 Thus, the 
origins of the Industrial Revolution are sought in the eighteenth century in vain.74 
Instead, its roots are imbedded in the long-run continuity of economic processes, and 
in the discoveries, inventions, and accomplishments of prior centuries.75 "Ordinarily 
we believe that growth won only once, in the `industrial revolution,'" asserts Eric 
Jones, but we fail to appreciate the extent to which "the pressure for growth was there 
all the time."76 From this vantage point, economic growth becomes a typical 
component of human experience, and the absence of growth atypical. Indeed, the 
recognition that Western Europe in the eighteenth century was wealthy in many 
respects (even by today's third-world standards), and that the economies were already 
complex, with widespread specialization, implies that intensive growth, even if slow 
and intermittent, must have been going on for a long time prior to 1760.77 
Synthesis 
 In order to synthesize the various viewpoints on the Industrial Revolution one 
should, above all, avoid singling out one aspect of it, and, instead, recognize its 
multidimensionality. This implies that, without belittling the contribution of such 
factors as technological change, we should acknowledge the myriad of other causes 
that made its success possible. None of these factors was sufficient to bring about the 
16
 
 
 
Revolution, but many of them were necessary.78 Its causes are to be sought in this 
complexity, and not in any single aspect of it. We need to abandon our focus on 
technology, and, instead, explore more systematically the generation of income and 
profit regardless of its source. We start by defining the Industrial Revolution as the 
economic upswing of the late-eighteenth century. It follows from this definition, that 
the Industrial Revolution becomes a pan-European phenomenon, insofar as the 
expansion, as the previous ones of the Middle Ages and of the Renaissance, was 
spatially widespread.79 We need also to appreciate both its evolutionary nature, in the 
sense that it grew out of earlier achievements, and its simultaneous revolutionary 
character as well, inasmuch as it had many unique features.80 Without being 
exhaustive, one might mention that it inaugurated an unprecedented period of 
economic prosperity, even if not immediately for all; it brought about a persistent 
sectoral shift out of agricultural production; it created new social classes, redistributed 
political power and signaled the end of the Malthusian demographic regime.81 The 
essential point to stress is that the Industrial Revolution was a continuation of earlier 
growth, but brought about a discontinuity in the processes of growth. 
  In the pre-industrial world rapid population growth for an extensive period was 
fraught with danger.82 Whenever population densities neared critical levels, the 
procurement of food became ever more problematic, and overshooting these ceilings 
led to subsistence crisis of various proportions.83 At such times nature struck back 
with vengeance. The expansion of the Roman Empire was followed by the Dark Ages. 
The spectacular upswing of the Middle Ages fizzled out in the fourteenth century with 
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adverse climatic trends, followed by stagnation and the catastrophic shock of the 
bubonic plague. The "Commercial Revolution", too, was overtaken by the crisis of the 
seventeenth century. While there were reversals, each of these upswing started from a 
higher capital/labor ratio than the previous one. In other words, while growth itself 
was intermittent, the accumulation of human and physical capital had a persistently 
positive trend. 
 Hence, the acceleration in the growth of total product after 1760 started from a 
higher capital/labor ratio then earlier upswings, and this enabled growth to become 
permanent, inasmuch as it was no longer constrained by mortality shocks. Knowledge 
of disease control was advanced enough by then to prevent major epidemics that had 
killed so many in prior centuries. The institution of quarantine measures, and the 
development of smallpox inoculation are just two measures that counteracted the 
devastating effects of epidemic outbreaks.84 The consequence of a more equal 
distribution of nutrients, of improved agricultural terms of trade, and of better control 
over the disease environment, in contrast to the sixteenth century, meant that 
Europeans could continue to reproduce even in face of a steep rise in their numbers. 
Compared to the previous demographic upswing of the sixteenth century, production 
as well as trade in nutrients was much better developed by 1760. The New World 
provided nutrients in the form of sugar, dried cod, flour, and most importantly, new 
products such as the potato which increased agricultural productivity greatly 
(measured in calories per acre).85 In addition, regions of grain production in Eastern 
Europe were integrated into the European trading network to a greater degree than 
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ever before. Moreover, transportation and storage facilities had improved sufficiently 
to distribute food locally to the indigent, so that subsistence crises would not return 
with the same vengeance as in the fourteenth, and again in the seventeenth centuries.86 
Thus, not only was more food available per capita compared to similar phases of 
previous demographic expansions, but its distribution was also more equal. 
 As in similar episodes in the past, the increased market activity during the 
Industrial Revolution was also accompanied by an acceleration in population growth.87 
This was not a coincidence: population growth increased demand, and thereby led to a 
further division of labor. It lowered transaction and information costs, and brought 
about economies of scale in production with positive feedback effects conducive to 
market expansion.88 It also induced technological change, by creating challenges that 
invited a creative response.89 In addition, the acceleration in population growth 
brought about urbanization, which had a further impact on technological change, 
inasmuch as urban environments are more conducive to human capital formation than 
rural ones.90 This model thus synthesizes Malthusian and Boserupian notions of the 
ways in which population growth and economic growth were intertwined in the 
pre-industrial era.91 The two effects alternated. Once one, then the other was more 
powerful, until the very end of the process, when the Malthusian forces weakened, and 
the Boserupian forces permanently gained the upper hand.92 
 We should evaluate the quantitative evidence of economic performance during 
the Industrial Revolution relative to previous experience, rather than those of the 
twentieth century. That labor productivity did not grow faster during the last third of 
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the eighteenth century becomes immaterial: important is that it was not negative. 
"Although productivity growth was gradual, it was high enough to sustain a much 
increased population which, under earlier economic circumstances, would have 
perished." 93 The late eighteenth century was that watershed when thousands of years 
of ingenuity, striving, and effort culminated in a solution to the problem that had been 
the single most important challenge to Mankind: the problem of survival.94 
 The broaching of the Malthusian ceilings on an enduring basis meant that 
economic growth became permanent (i.e., self-sustaining) inasmuch as population 
grew unconstrained, and economic growth followed naturally in its wake, as in prior 
occasions.95 The positive forces of growth had existed all along.96 However, they had 
been counterbalanced by the negative forces of malnutrition and disease. Once these 
checks on growth vanished, it became possible to escape from the food-controlled 
homeostatic equilibrium that had prevailed since time immemorial. Insofar as neither 
the upswing in economic activity nor the demographic revolution was confined to 
England, conceptualizing the Industrial Revolution in this manner also leads 
automatically to viewing it as a pan-European experience. 
 In sum, the European societies were sufficiently advanced, and were able to 
grow sufficiently quickly to feed themselves, and to overcome the capital-diluting 
effects of population growth, even as an increasing share of the labor force was 
detached from the land. The minimum nutritional needs of a growing population were 
met in the face of increasing pauperization, even if the biological standard of living 
deteriorated in the short run for the common man. People did become shorter, but a 
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major subsistence crisis failed to materialize, as it did in the seventeenth century.97  
People who in previous similar episodes would have perished now remained alive, 
thereby contributing to production. Humanity was liberated from the constraints 
imposed by diminishing returns to labor in the agricultural sector: hence, the Industrial 
Revolution meant, above all, an escape from the Malthusian trap.98 The last in a 
succession of economic-demographic upswings, this view enables us to retain the 
importance of the Industrial Revolution in human history without requiring either 
inputs or outputs to grow at a pre-conceived rate.99 The advantage of conceiving of the 
Industrial Revolution in this way is that it ceases to focus on proximate causes. 
Instead, the Revolution is placed in the context of the long-run development of the 
European economies. Moreover, the emphasis is shifted from Great Britain to the 
Atlantic economy, and from technological change to the overall 
productivity-enhancing factors that induced an upward shift in the production 
function. Instead of selected sectors one’s focus is on the different ways income was 
generated. One gains thereby a more thorough appreciation of the interaction of 
economic and demographic processes, and the latter's feedback effects on economic 
growth. One has a comparative framework to judge the achievements of the Industrial 
Revolution in light of earlier, as well as of subsequent developments. Its continuous 
and discontinuous aspects become more clearly delineated. Above all, this framework 
enables us to gain a more balanced appreciation of its multidimensionality: it widens 
our horizons, and captures the Industrial Revolution in the perspective of thousands of 
years of human development.
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